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abstract  Musical formalism is often portrayed as the enemy of artistic free-
dom. Its main representative, Eduard Hanslick, is seen as a purist who, by em-
phasizing musical rules, aims at restricting music criticism and even musical 
practices themselves. It may also seem that formalism is depriving music of 
its ability to have moral significance, as the semantic connection to the extra-
musical is denied by the formalistic view. In my paper, I defend formalism by 
placing Hanslick’s argument in a Kantian framework. It is not hard to find 
Kantian elements in Hanslick’s work, such as his emphasis on the contempla-
tive and disinterested nature of the aesthetic judgment, the nonconceptuality 
of music’s content, and his insistence that “beauty has no purpose.” I argue 
further that Hanslick’s formalism is in fact motivated by and manifests the 
Kantian conception of freedom as self-legislation. Thus understood, the kind 
of moral significance music may have rests upon its own autonomous rules.
keywords Hanslick, Kant, formalism, musical understanding, autonomy of 
music
I. Introduction
Musical formalism is not a popular view. At least not in the original sense 
of the term which refers to Eduard Hanslick’s claim that the content of 
music is nothing but “tonally moving forms.”1 In the literature, a typical 
way of addressing Hanslick is to portray him as a “narrow-minded” dog-
matic who advocates “purist,” “barren,” “restrictive,” “doctrinaire,” and 
“aesthetically paranoid” conceptions of music.2 Hanslick’s famous essay 
Vom Musikalisch-Schönen is usually read as an account of music’s essen-
tial properties that are independent of historical and cultural variation.3 
Such an essentialist reading is, in turn, easily associated with conserva-
tive implications about what counts as good music. Hanslick is portrayed 
as a purist who, by emphasizing musical rules, puts forth strong restric-
tions on the practice of music criticism and perhaps even on musical 
practices themselves. In this sense, musical formalism is taken to be an 
enemy of artistic freedom. It may also seem that formalism is depriving 
music of its ability to have moral significance, as the semantic connec-
tion to the extramusical is denied by the formalistic view.
Another way of handling musical formalism is the attempt to neutralize 
it altogether. This is done by claiming that Hanslick’s view is not that radi-
cal after all. It is not hard to find books or articles suggesting that Hanslick 
actually endorses some weaker version of the emotionalist theory, i.e., the 
view that music is in one way or another expressive of human emotions. 
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And if not endorsing a weaker version of emotionalist theory, then at 
least he failed to consider the most viable version of emotionalism.4 The 
claim is that, instead of offering a real alternative to the view that music’s 
content is bound up with human emotions, Hanslick simply criticized 
nowadays straw-man theories that explain the musical expressiveness of 
emotions by appealing to composers’ self-expression or to the emotions 
music arouses in the audience. Furthermore, Hanslick is frequently ac-
cused of outright inconsistency based on his use of emotive terminology 
in his musical criticisms. Formalism is such an unsustainable position, it 
is argued, that even its main advocate could not hold fast to it.5 In general, 
the debate on musical meaning is so dominated by the emotionalist view 
that discussion on Hanslick typically centers on the question of whether 
he allowed some kind of relation between music and emotions after all. 
This is unfortunate as it effectively prevents discussion on what the con-
sequences and the motivations of his account of music as tonally moving 
forms might be.
In this paper, my goal is to defend musical formalism by placing 
Hanslick’s argument in a broader Kantian framework. Hanslick men-
tions Kant only once by name in his essay, listing him as one of those 
“eminent people” who have affirmed the contentlessness of music.6 Yet, 
it is not hard to find fundamentally Kantian elements in Hanslick’s work, 
such as his emphasis on the contemplative and disinterested nature of 
the aesthetic judgment, the nonconceptuality of music’s content, and his 
insistence that beauty has no purpose. I argue further that these are not 
merely superficial similarities. In my reading, Hanslick’s formalism is in 
fact motivated by and manifests the Kantian conception of freedom as 
self-legislation. Thus understood, the only way in which music may be 
seen as having any moral significance in the first place is by a commit-
ment to the notion of the absolute autonomy of music.
II. The Autonomy of Musical Beauty
Hanslick begins his essay by pointing out an error in the musical aes-
thetics of his day. This error is based on the idea that there is one single 
essence or quality common to all works of art. According to Hanslick, 
every other field of aesthetics has abandoned the idea of a general con-
cept of beauty from which the aesthetics of any particular art could be 
derived. However, musical aesthetics still tries to assimilate music into 
a paradigm of beauty that explains beauty as being dependent on the 
content of the artwork. This is how the erroneous thought, identified by 
Hanslick, works: Paintings are about landscapes or historical events and 
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literature is about intriguing characters facing complicated moral dilem-
mas, so surely music too must be about something. Given that music has 
no readily perceptible extramusical content, feelings or (in the vocabulary 
of contemporary musical aesthetics which I shall adopt) emotions must 
constitute music’s content. Consequently, the expression of emotions 
must be music’s primary purpose.7 
Such is Hanslick’s diagnosis of 19th century musical aesthetics. And 
little has changed. Analytic philosophy of music is dominated by ac-
counts that aim at explaining the relation between music and human 
emotions. Hanslick rejects this still influential view. According to him, 
emotions have nothing to do with the content of music. Nor is the 
arousal of emotions the purpose of music. The arousal of emotions is 
not the purpose of music, as “beauty has no purpose at all.”8 Now, this 
quote might as well be taken from Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judg-
ment in which Kant famously argues that the purposiveness we find in 
a judgment of the beautiful is not based on any real purpose. In Kant’s 
view, judgments of taste have “formal purposiveness” that cannot be 
subsumed under any concepts. For Kant, a pure judgment of taste is 
always independent of determinate concepts, ends, or interests, includ-
ing emotions.9 This is also the direction of Hanslick’s thought.
According to Hanslick, the musically beautiful is not based on extra-
musical concepts. This means, first, that even when music (like opera or 
lied) is composed to a text, music still follows its own specifically musical 
laws. The more the composer aims at imitating the content of the text, 
the more the end result approaches musically uninteresting recitative. 
Hanslick brings up numerous examples to show how texts of different 
emotive contents may be accompanied by the same musical material 
without significant loss to the work’s aesthetic quality.10 
Second, as Hanslick among the very first recognizes, emotions are not 
independent of concepts. Instead, the very definiteness of emotions rests 
on “ideas, judgments, and (in brief) the whole range of intelligible and 
rational thought to which people so readily oppose feelings.”11 Given that 
music is incapable of denoting concepts, it cannot express, represent, 
or portray specific emotions. Hanslick grants that music can resemble 
one aspect of emotions, namely, the motion of the psychological12 pro-
cess: music can be fast, slow, strong, weak, rising, or falling. However, in 
Hanslick’s view, this resemblance is not enough to warrant the interpret-
ation of music as portraying a psychological process of which the same 
motion is characteristic. 
Third, explaining music by reference to composers’ intentions would 
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also render the musical beauty heteronomous. As Hanslick argues – 100 
years before Wimsatt and Beardsley’s celebrated article “The Intentional 
Fallacy” – whatever intentions the composer may have had while com-
posing the work, they have no relevance for the work’s meaning. Or 
more specifically, insofar as such intentions, i.e., musical thoughts, are 
relevant, they are already embedded in the work itself and hence there is 
no need to appeal to them in the explanation of the work. 13 If the com-
poser is dissatisfied with the orchestration of a symphony, say, he does 
not first turn to investigate his own emotional state to find a solution, as 
Deryck Cooke would have it. Nor does he consult his general knowledge 
of the human psyche, as Suzanne Langer suggests.14 Instead, the com-
poser treats the problem in terms of musical instruments and their roles 
in the score. The kinds of problems the composer faces and the kinds of 
solutions he or she seeks for them arise from music itself, and knowledge 
of human emotions does not help him or her one bit in tackling such 
musical problems. 
A fourth case of heteronomy lurks in our tendency to describe mu-
sic in natural language. Contrary to what is often falsely claimed, Han-
slick does not ban emotive descriptions of music.15 In fact, he grants 
that sometimes we cannot do without emotive terminology when talk-
ing about music.16 Nevertheless, given that people often disagree about 
such descriptions we should be careful not to take such descriptions as 
evidence of music’s content and infer that music depicts, expresses, or 
refers to something extramusical. According to Peter Kivy, this argu-
ment is “very bad.” In Kivy’s view, “anyone who has ever performed the 
simple experiment of playing brief expressive passages of the kind of 
music Hanslick is talking about to a group of quite ordinary listeners […] 
knows quite well that the responses, far from being chaotic and random, 
are actually predictable and consistent.” 17 Now, let me just mention that 
this has not been my experience. Nor have I not found compelling em-
pirical evidence for such consistency in the listeners’ responses beyond 
the agreement that fast music in major keys may be called “happy” and 
slow music in minor keys may be called “sad.”18 But I do not think Kivy’s 
reading is the most charitable rendering of Hanslick’s argument either. 
Hanslick writes:
Who will come forward and venture to declare that some specific feeling is the 
content of these themes? One person will say “love.” Possibly. Another thinks 
“yearning.” Perhaps. A third feels “piety.” Nobody can refute any of them. And 
so it goes.19 
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In my reading, Hanslick’s point is that emotive descriptions of music 
lack the kinds of grounds that would force one to accept them as true 
as well as criteria that could be used to distinguish correct emotive 
attrib utions from incorrect ones. Usually there are several, equally apt 
ways to characterize a given musical theme (and not just in emotive 
terms but also in many other figurative ways), and there is no point in 
trying to establish one of such characterizations as the correct descrip-
tion of the theme’s content. Hence, instead of reading such descriptions 
literally, we should settle for assigning the evidentially less demanding 
status of “figurative” or “metaphorical” to them.20 
It is also important to notice that Hanslick is not entirely happy with 
the supposedly more kosher technical analyses either. These, he claims, 
make “a skeleton out of a flourishing organism”; they are “apt to destroy 
all beauty but at the same time all misguided interpreting.”21 This is to 
say that the more technical descriptions of a given musical passage or 
work usually amount to nothing but trivialities and as such they leave 
the rich and concrete auditory reality of music largely untouched. In gen-
eral the problem is that, insofar as we want to talk about music, we have 
to use either technical terminology or resort to emotive or other figura-
tive characterizations. In doing so, we are effectively taking a step out of 
the medium of music itself. This is why Hanslick claims that, in order to 
convey the content of a musical theme to someone, “we will have to play 
for him the theme itself.”22
The above four ways of subsuming music under extramusical con-
cepts have one problematic thing in common. In all of them, music is 
explained by appealing to a set of explanans from a realm of phenom-
ena separate from music itself. However – and this, I believe, has been 
Hanslick’s point all along – music has its very own set of laws or rules. 
Because of this, the attempt to understand music by referring to the 
laws or regularities of human emotions or forcing music to follow the 
narrative of a poem is to commit a category mistake. It is like explain-
ing human intentional action in causal terms. In some sense it may be 
possible. Human action does have a causal aspect to it, composers have 
mental states that are causally linked to the production of their works, 
and musical phrases resemble some psychological processes more than 
they resemble others. But how helpful are such explanations for our 
understanding of the explanandum? According to Hanslick, not very. 
It is not just that the appeal to extramusical principles conflicts with 
the Kantian requirements of nonconceptuality and disinterestedness of 
the judgment of taste. It is also that “each particular art demands to be 
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understood only of itself, through knowledge of its unique technical 
characteristics.”23 Only by looking at how the musical elements function 
in their musical context can we begin to understand the musical reasons 
behind musical action. 
III. Three Important Points about the Musical Rules 
According to Hanslick, it is the rules of a musical system and nothing 
else that composers deal with when they write music. Music does not 
convey extramusical contents that could be translated into another me-
dium. Music’s content is the tonal forms themselves. The tonal forms 
express musical thoughts that are inseparable from the musical forms 
themselves, and the rules that govern the application of the materials 
of a musical system reside in the system itself. These rules are also the 
relevant framework of listening to music with understanding. Does this 
commit Hanslick to an essentialist view about music as has been assumed 
by many? I do not think so. Over and over again, Hanslick stresses how, 
instead of subsuming music under a general metaphysical principle, we 
should focus on the “immanent” rather than “transcendent” features of 
music. This means focusing on “music’s grammatical rules.” 24
Any mention of rules is obviously likely to strengthen the im pression 
of Hanslick as the pedantic school master caricatured in the role of 
Beckmesser in Wagner’s Meistersinger. And indeed, if the rules Hanslick 
talks about were independent of the musical system like, e.g., the regu-
lations of the Union of Soviet Composers controlling what passed as 
politically correct music in the Soviet Union, then the worry would be 
justified. Regulative rules derived from extramusical principles would 
indeed limit the freedom of composers as well as turn the understanding 
of music into an exercise of mechanically translating musical phrases 
into political dictums or emotional reports. But the musical grammar 
Hanslick talks about has little to do with such regulative prohibitions 
and obligations. There is no sanction for failure to follow the musical 
rules or for breaking them. Rather, the kinds of rules Hanslick refers 
to constitute the very musical system. One could not compose Western 
tonal music except by following at least some of those rules.
As Hanslick’s choice of the word “immanent” suggests, the musical 
grammar he has in mind is not like Chomsky’s generative grammar 
that will be revealed some day after years of empirical investigation. 
Hanslick’s primary interest lies in the musical materials themselves, in 
“the entire system of tones, with their latent possibilities for melodic, 
harmonic and rhythmic variety.”25 Insofar as there are any essentialist 
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implications here, then they come closer to Wittgenstein’s later remark 
that “essence is expressed by grammar,”26 which is just another way of 
saying that there is no essence to be found beyond the conventions of our 
language or, in Hanslick’s case, the conventions of our musical system. 
In contrast with the spirit of essentialism, Hanslick stresses the historic-
ity and cultural contingency of the musical rules. They do not have a 
prototype in nature, nor are they created by God. In general, one should 
“be on guard against the error that this tonal system (this present one) 
necessarily exists in nature.”27 Instead, “our Western European music,” 
as Hanslick calls it, is an artifact that has developed gradually and will 
continue to develop.28 
It is also noteworthy that, by “tonally moving forms,” Hanslick does 
not primarily refer to large scale forms such as the fugue, the oratorio, 
or the manifestations of the sonata form as has been assumed by some.29 
The musical forms Hanslick seems to have in mind are closer to basic 
principles of harmony, melody, and rhythm. This may strengthen the 
typical prejudice according to which formalism puts too much emphasis 
on the structural or syntactic properties of our musical system and does 
this at the expense of other aspects of music, such as timbre, accentu-
ation, and other such nuances that cannot be captured in the score. But 
there is no reason why the formalist should assume that musical nota-
tion is somehow more authoritative than the actual, performed music. In 
fact, Hanslick’s phrase “tönend bewegte Formen,” translated by Payzant 
as “tonally moving forms,” implies that he is talking about music that is 
already heard and not just studied based on the score. The German word 
tönend is the adjectival form of the verb tönen, to sound. The movement 
of the forms, Bewegung der Formen, is thus said to happen by sounding, 
which implies that the tonal forms are perceived primarily by listening.30 
This means that also the rules of music are primarily given in the perfor-
mances of musical works where music’s fine nuances are on a par with 
its more structural properties. 
But does not Hanslick’s emphasis on the objective rules of music cre-
ate a gulf between his view and that of Kant? After all, for Kant, it is the 
subject’s feelings of pleasure and displeasure, not the objective rules of 
art, which function as the determining grounds of a judgment of taste. 
While it is impossible to fully address the possible disanalogy here, there 
are two things worth mentioning that might alleviate the worry. First, as I 
have just argued, Hanslick’s rules are not extramusical rule formulations 
in some written manual for composers. Instead, “they reside, though not in 
a manner open to scientific investigation, instinctively in every cultivated 
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ear, which accordingly perceives the organic, rational coherence of a group 
of tones, or its absurdity or unnaturalness, by mere contemplation, with 
no concept as its criterion or tertium comparationis.”31 In fact, there are 
no explicit examples of musical rules in Hanslick’s essay, but the terms 
grammar, rule, and technique seem to function as general reminders of the 
autonomous yet structured medium of music. Second, while for Kant the 
notion of a rule would typically suggest a connection to a concept, in the 
context of aesthetics this is not the case. In the few sections of the Third 
Critique where Kant focuses on art (instead of his main concern, i.e., nature 
of the judgment of taste), he states that art presupposes rules. The rules of 
art do not have concepts as their grounds. Nor can they be stated in the 
form of formulas or precepts. Instead, the rules of art must be abstracted 
from the products of a genius. The genius, i.e., a particular predisposition 
of the human mind, cannot itself “describe or indicate scientifically how it 
brings its products into being,” but rather functions as a channel for nature 
to give the rule to art. While the artistic products of a genius are not the 
result of imitation, they serve others in that way as standards or rules for 
judging art.32 In the light of these remarks, the potential gulf between Kant 
and Hanslick does not seem that deep after all.
  
IV. Rules and Freedom
Up to now, I have argued that Hanslick is not promoting an essential-
ist theory of music, rather, he is in the business of defending music’s 
autonomy in a Kantian sense. After all, what would it mean to look for 
the essence of a cultural phenomenon like music? The essentialist claim 
would simply be a normative claim in disguise. And this is, in fact, a 
typical charge against formalism. Hanslick is represented as “a pedantic 
mediocrity blindly opposing all innovation.”33 The idea is that Hanslick’s 
emphasis on the rules of music entails stylistic preferences and a lack of 
appreciation for creative freedom and musical progress.
However, rather than seeking to uncover the essence of music or dic-
tate criteria for good music, throughout his essay, Hanslick’s focus is on 
music’s content and on musical understanding.34 If read in this way, then 
formalism does not entail the superiority of specific standards for the 
evaluation of music. Hanslick himself writes:
The whole drift of the present inquiry avoids questions of what ought to be 
and considers only what is. From this it deduces no particular musical ideal as 
the only genuine musical beauty but merely establishes in the same way for all 
schools [of music] what the beautiful is in each, even the most antagonistic.35
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Given that the rules of music are constitutive rather than regulative 
rules, they do not determine what may be done with them. In actual 
performances, the rules may be followed faithfully, but they may also be 
applied in novel ways or broken. It is in the musician’s discretion what 
he or she decides to do with the rules, and perhaps the grounds on which 
such choices are made may include other things besides the rules them-
selves. Similarly, the listeners have the freedom to form their own views 
on performances and works. Just as one can understand a sentence and 
disagree with what it says, one can recognize the musical goals of a given 
performance and disagree with the performer’s choice to develop this 
line of performative interpretation as opposed to another.
To be sure, the fact that Hanslick talks about both musical meaning 
and musical beauty may create the false impression that he is advocat-
ing a theory of what counts as good music. However, the formalistic 
view that music’s content resides in the application of the various forms 
that constitute the tonal system does not entail an explanation of what 
makes these forms better or worse. Hanslick’s point is rather that musi-
cal beauty is a special, self-subsistent type of beauty that should not be 
assimilated into any other type or subsumed under a general concept of 
beauty. Besides, Hanslick’s term “Musikalisch-Schönen” does not mean 
musical beauty in the evaluative sense of the term. As Geoffrey Payzant, 
the translator of the standard English edition of Hanslick’s essay, has 
shown, insofar as Hanslick offers a more positive account of this spe-
cifically musical type of beauty, it is simply “tonally moving forms.”36 In 
other words, the phrase “musically beautiful” is just another expression 
for the autonomous content of music.  
But if there is a normative aspect in Hanslick’s essay, then it is related, 
not to music as such, but to us in our roles as listeners. One of Hanslick’s 
reasons for rejecting the emotionalist view is that it encourages what he 
calls a “pathological” mode of listening, a mode that turns the listeners’ 
attention away from the concrete features of music itself. It makes no dif-
ference for Hanslick whether the listener is looking for emotive satisfac-
tion, better digestion, or moral edification in the musical experience. None 
of these approaches to music “proceeds out of free self-determination,” 
Hanslick writes.37 By contrast, while the formalistic truism of music’s con-
tent as tonally moving forms does not yet tell us what these forms are or 
how they are to be performed or developed, it nevertheless encourages the 
listeners to focus on the music itself. Without attention to the specifically 
musical, our appreciation of music may turn out to be nothing but an in-
articulate and empty exclamation “Ah!”, “How charming!” that tells more 
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about the subjective states of the listener than about music. Hanslick ridi-
cules such responses, comparing the naive listener to an animal that may 
be affected by music but does not understand music in a sense relevant for 
aesthetics.38 
It is here, I think, that Hanslick comes closest to Kant’s philosophy. 
According to Kant, aesthetic judgments differ in principle from judg-
ments about the agreeable that concern, e.g., the tastes of wine and food. 
Such culinary judgments are related to desire and to a liking that is con-
ditioned “pathologically” by stimuli. Judgments about the agreeable ul-
timately refer to empirical generalizations and hence to laws of nature. 
This is why also non-rational animals are capable of taking pleasure in 
the agreeable, Kant argues. Yet, aesthetic judgments ought to be qualitat-
ively different. Kant writes: “if our sole aim were enjoyment, it would be 
foolish to be so scrupulous about the means for getting it.”39 One might 
as well enjoy sparkling wine from the Canaries, as Kant suggests. Or 
light up a cigar, as Hanslick recommends. If one is just looking for emo-
tive satisfaction from music, then it should not matter if the satisfac-
tion results from drugs, piquant delicacies or a hot bath.40 In general, 
Hanslick criticizes the “pathological view” of music for the fact, in that 
view, “musical achievements are to be included along with products of 
nature which delight us, but which do not make us think, do not make us 
aware of the creative intelligence.”41 
Here, too, the point is the nature of the connection between the judg-
ment and its object. For the arousal of emotions by music is a causal 
process, much like the mechanism between drinking wine and getting 
drunk. If the listener voluntarily places herself within the causal mech-
anism of the arousal of emotions, then she also deprives herself of the 
freedom that music as a system of autonomous rules offers for her con-
templation and in that sense for participation. By contrast, according 
to Kant and – as I have argued – Hanslick, judgments of the beautiful 
are autonomous in the sense of following their own laws that cannot 
be translated or reduced to the principles of another medium. An aes-
thetic explanation that appeals to human emotions overlooks this cru-
cial difference. While the more contemporary versions of the emotional-
ist account of music may be in many ways more sophisticated than the 
versions against which Hanslick argues, they do not differ significantly 
from them in this particular respect. They, too, explain music by refer-
ence to an empirical connection between music and human emotions, 
for example, by reference to a connection resulting from “evolutionary 
hard-wiring.”42 If I am right, this kind of a naturalistic solution is simply 
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not available for Hanslick. From the Kantian perspective, it is only by 
reference to autonomous rules as opposed to empirical laws of nature 
that freedom is conceivable in the first place.
Above, I mentioned Kivy’s claim about the listeners’ ability to dis-
cern music’s emotive character, namely, that in his view the listeners’ 
emotive responses are “predictable and consistent.” Hanslick, in turn, 
rejects emotionalism because “the effect of music upon feeling pos-
sesses neither the necessity nor the exclusiveness nor the constancy 
which a phenomenon would have to exhibit in order to be the basis 
of an aesthetic principle.”43 In other words, as far as the listeners’ emo-
tive responses to music are concerned, Kivy finds them predictable and 
consistent, Hanslick as lacking exclusiveness and constancy. But it is 
Hanslick’s requirement of necessity that marks the gravest difference 
between the two. For necessities and evolutionary hard-wiring do not 
make a good fit. Even if the listeners did, as a matter of empirical fact, 
agree on what emotive characterizations fit what musical themes, this 
would not yet be enough for Hanslick. The kind of aesthetic principle 
he is looking for would rest on a more solid foundation than an empiri-
cal generalization ever could even if it were true as a matter of empiri-
cal statistical fact.
What, then, is the nature of the necessity Hanslick requires of his ideal 
principle of musical aesthetics? Payzant compares Hanslick’s principle 
to Kant’s categorical imperative.44 While I do not share Payzant’s view 
that Hanslick wants to define the essence of music, the kind of principle 
Hanslick is looking for should indeed be characterized as a transcendental 
principle. It is meant to have the kind of apodictic force that Kant attri-
butes to his categorical imperative, i.e., that the principle is “bound up with 
the consciousness of its necessity.”45 Kant’s categorical imperative or the 
various formulations of the categorical imperative do not state which acts 
are right or wrong, but rather aim at capturing something about the basis 
of morality which any rational being should accept as necessarily true. In 
my reading, Hanslick’s so-called positive thesis that “the content of music 
is tonally moving forms” is meant to be understood along the same lines. 
For what would it mean to deny that music is tonally moving forms? For 
example, the debate between the formalist and the emotionalist does not 
pertain to the question whether music consists of the movement of tonal 
forms. To say that it does is as trivial as the claim that language consists of 
words and sentences. Rather, the debate concerns the further interpreta-
tion of the tonal forms. While the formalist holds that the forms do not 
have any other content than themselves, the emotionalist wants to say 
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something more, namely, that the tonal forms are somehow expressive of 
human emotions and that the understanding of music requires that the 
listener recognizes emotions in music. 
Hanslick rejects the emotionalist theory of music because he sees it as 
an instance of subjecting music to empirical laws of nature and conse-
quently to heteronomy. The reasons for Hanslick’s stance are similar to 
the reasons for resisting explanations of human action simply by refer-
ence to causes; they are related to a concern with giving up an essential 
aspect of freedom. The only way of protecting the possibility of freedom 
– freedom in music, freedom in musicianship, freedom in listening to 
music – is by replacing the heteronomous aesthetic principles with one 
that arises from music itself. This principle is available in the form of 
the musical rules. Given that these rules are constitutive of music itself, 
explaining music by appealing to these rules carries the kind of necessity 
Hanslick demands of his preferred aesthetic principle of music. 46
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